Israeli army's damaged reputation   
By  Christopher True 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The army was unable to stem rocket attacks into northern Israel last year
[AFP] 

Traditionally, Israel's army has been seen as one of the world's most
formidable fighting forces. 
 
However, in 2006, Hezbollah, an organisation that Israel believed it would
defeat in days, dealt what was seen by many as a devastating blow to the
Israeli military's reputation.

Analysis of Israel's spectacularly successful campaign against Arab forces
in 1967 and Hezbollah's tactics in 2006 show striking parallels. 
 
Special report 
 
A series of reports on the Middle East one year after the war in Lebanon
 
 
 

 
Forty years ago, Israel had used a combination of military intelligence,
effective leadership and an unwavering belief in its cause to devastating
effect.

In 2006, it was Hezbollah's turn to harness these strengths and secure
what even it saw as a seemingly improbable defeat against its enemy.

 

Intelligent thinking

 

Chita Cohen was the commander of a helicopter squadron when Israel
launched its aerial attack, Moked (Operation Focus) on Arab forces at
7.45am on June 5, 1967.

 

Cohen attributes the success of Moked to three factors - the element of
surprise, the targeting of weak points and the efficiency of the Israeli
air force. 

 

Israeli pilots came in below radar cover and attacked airfields that had
been pinpointed in advance.

 

The bases were attacked in the morning, when Arab pilots were still
breakfasting, and to keep up the momentum Israeli pilots often flew four
or five sorties a day. 

 

The first two of these factors were underpinned by the strength of
Israel's military intelligence, whose careful research paved the way for
Israel's success.

 

Mouin Rabbani, a Middle East expert at the International Crisis Group,
says: "In 1967 the Arabs were unprepared for war, in 2006 Hezbollah were. 

 

"Hezbollah had excellent intelligence about Israel while Israel had poor
intelligence against Hezbollah."

 


 
 Hassan Nasrallah became a powerful symbol
for Hezbollah's resistance to Israel [AFP] 
 
A dedicated Hezbollah unit recruited agents who were able to gather
information about Israel's military bases and other high-level targets
that were to prove vital in 2006.

 

In contrast, Israeli intelligence made a tactical mistake in believing
that if operations were pursued against Hezbollah, support for the
movement would be minimal.  

 

Helped by funding from Iran, Hezbollah had widespread support among
Lebanon's towns and villages, paying for school fees and medical expenses,
providing health insurance and offering money for people to start up small
businesses.

 

Jamil Mroue, publisher of Beirut's The Daily Star newspaper, said: "Israel
viewed Hezbollah from a terrorist prism, it treated them as if they were
not part of society itself.

 

"It attacked Hezbollah on the presumption that the local population would
not help the movement, as it had failed to help the Palestinians in 1982."

 

Instead, much of the Lebanese population, even those who were not Shia,
were to stand by Hezbollah during the conflict. 

 

Lacking leadership 

 

Mroue said: "The men who fought in 1967 went on to produce a long line of
leaders, prime ministers, generals. They had a kind of quality.

 

"The men who lead the army now are no longer so focused, so intense, no
longer burnt by the holocaust, which the leaders of 1967 were still close
to."

 

 
Hezbollah fighters in south
Lebanon [AP]  
Rabbani is more blunt, he said: "Israeli society has changed vastly over
the last 40 years. In many ways it has become lazy and corpulent.

 

"This is reflected in the state of the army, which has become a pig
trough, a professional army in the worst sense of the word. 

 

"It has become institutionalised and unable to learn from its mistakes. In
terms of its leadership, it is the worst possible people that have risen
to the top."

 

In 2006, this lack of leadership was reflected on the ground, with
problems equipping reservists and misguided strategies on the ground.

 

In contrast Haaretz, the Israeli newspaper, was moved to describe
Hezbollah as a trained, skilled, well-organised, and highly motivated
infantry.

 

Collective inexperience

 

In 2006, the lack of leadership in the army was matched by the poor
leadership of the Israeli government.

 

Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz's defence correspondent and an expert on the Israeli
army, said: "This was the first time in Israel's history that neither the
prime minister, defence minister or foreign minister had any military
experience."

 

Schiff feels that Israel's military operation was hindered by Ehud Olmert,
the prime minister, whose handling of the war he describes as "a problem".

 

He believes that Israel should have struck with overwhelming force early
on in order to prevent a prolonged campaign.

 

Schiff is critical of Olmert's cabinet which debated this strategy, but
then opted for a lesser use of air and artillery firepower and a limited
movement of troops on the ground.

 

General Shlomo Gazit was head of research for Aman (Israeli army
intelligence) in the run up to the 1967 war and director of Aman from 1974
to 1978.

 

 
Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister, lacked
the experience of fighting a war [EPA]  
He believes if the war in 2006 had been handled differently Israel "could
have occupied Lebanon in 48 hours".

 

Gazit also criticises Olmert: "He didn't have any military experience. He
didn't know the right questions to ask the military. He is totally blank
when it comes to understanding the military, the Middle East and the Arab
mentality."

 

The chronic lack of leadership within Israel's army and government was a
marked contrast to the direction given by Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's
secretary general.

 

Nasrallah became a powerful symbol for Hezbollah's resistance to Israel
and it was clear that the movement's fighters had a strong belief in him
as their leader.

 

Just cause

 

The question of belief is the final contrast between 1967 and 2006.

 

In 1967 the Israeli nation was less than 20-years old and there was still
a high degree of idealism among its population.

 

Israel argued that it had to make a pre-emptive attack on its Arab
neighbours in order to defend itself and its actions were overwhelmingly
supported by its citizens.

 

The takeover of areas such as East Jerusalem gave tremendous zeal to the
army in its operations.

 

In 2006, as the conflict in Lebanon dragged on, Israel seemed unsure both
of its tactics and the legitimacy of its actions.

 

This time it was Hezbollah that felt it was fighting a just cause,
defending the population from an invader which was to eventually kill more
than 1,000 civilians.

 

As recriminations over Lebanon continue in Israel, the country's military,
and indeed its government, have a number of difficult questions to face.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Al Jazeera 
 


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